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TERRORISM: THE PROPOSED UNITED STATES
DRAFT CONVENTION
In the wake of the recent General Assembly Resolution on Terrorism,' the
United States has introduced to the United Nations General Assembly a Draft
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of Interna-
tional Terrorism. 2 The Proposed Draft contains key provisions defining as
unlawful offenses: killing, kidnapping, infliction of serious bodily harm, and
attempting, or participating as an accomplice in, such acts, when such acts are
internationally significant.3
The United States has also called upon 4 the nations of the world to ratify
the three proposed hijacking conventions. 5 These conventions and the body of
international law relative to armed conflict will take precedence6 over the Pro-
posed Draft, in event of conflict, as will the recent O.A.S. Convention. 7 Taken
together, these conventions in conjunction with the Proposed Draft are viewed
by the United States as a joint attack on the increasing waves of terrorism.'
PRIOR CONVENTIONS
An international convention on terrorism is hardly a new idea. The Proposed
Draft has a precursor in the 1937 Geneva Convention.' But this convention
could not cope with the myriad acts of terrorism today. Conceived against the
'G.A. Res. 2625, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. -, U.N. Doc. A/-, (1972).
2U.S. Draft Convention for Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism Acts, II INT'L LEGAL
MAT'LS 1382 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as Proposed Draft]. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 26,
1972, § I, at 18, col. 3. The Proposed Draft was referred to the Sixth Committee under agenda
item 92.3Proposed Draft, id., art. 1 (1).
4N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1972, § 1, at 1, col. 5.
5International Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft,
done at Tokyo, Sept. 14, 1963, [19691 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768 [hereinafter referred to
as Tokyo Convention]; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizures of Aircraft, done at
The Hague, Dec. 16, 1970, [19711 - U.S.T. , T.I.A.S. No. 7192, 10 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS
133 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as the Hague Convention]: Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal, Sept. 23, 1971, [1973]
U.S.T. ., T.I.A.S. No. 7570, 10 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1151 (1971) (not in force) [hereinafter
referred to as Montreal Convention].
'Proposed Draft, supra note 2, art. 13, 14.
70.A.S. Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes
Against Persons and Related Extortion That Are of International Significance, done at Washing-
ton, Feb. 2, 1971, O.A.S. Doc. AG/doc. 88 rev.I corr. 1, 10 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 255 (1971)
[hereinafter referred to as O.A.S. Convention]. The O.A.S. Convention, although prepared for use
by the regional organization, is open for signature to nations from outside the region.
'United States Mission to the United Nations, Press Release USUN-104(72), at 9 (Sept. 25,
1972); N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1972, § 1, at I, col. 5.
'international Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, done at Geneva,
Nov. 16, 1937, in 7 HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 862 (1941) [hereinafter referred to as
Geneva Convention].
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background of the assassination of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia in 1934,10
the draft was primarily concerned with the assassination and kidnapping of
public officials and heads of state. However, it also included provisions on the
destruction of public property and "[a]ny wilful act calculated to endanger the
lives of members of the public."" Presumably, this last provision, while it
certainly would have covered the Lod massacre, would have been incapable of
dealing with the Munich Olympics or much of the current wave of letter bomb-
ing,' 2 despite its emphasis on conspiracy and other forms of group criminal-
ity 
3
These previous conventions have suffered from an inability to keep pace with
the ingenuity of terrorists, with hijacking cases being the most recent example.
While the Geneva Convention on the High Seas' visualized the possibility of
"air pirates," it seems to have contemplated only acts by persons on board one
aircraft against persons on board another.' 5 The possibility that an individual,
claiming to be politically motivated, might interfere with the flight of an air-
craft on which he was a passenger seems to have escaped the drafters of that
convention.
The Tokyo Convention" was the first to deal with hijacking realistically. But
it considers only those acts committed while the aircraft is "in flight," a period
defined as beginning with the moment that power is applied for take-off and
ending the moment that the landing run ends." The prohibited acts, moreover,
include only interference by persons on board the flight in the form of seizure
or other wrongful exercise of control.' 8 The primary concern of the convention
drafters was to fill in some gaps in jurisdiction over suspected offenders, to
delineate the aircraft commander's authority to restrain suspects and to provide
a means of restoring authority to the commander in the event of a hijacking."
As hijackings became more and more spectacular, the defects of the Tokyo
Convention became more apparent.
"HUDSON, supra note 9, ed. n. at 862.
"See Geneva Convention, supra note 9, art. 2(3).
"See N.Y. Times, Nov. II, 1972, § I at 1, col. 1. Eighteen letter-bombs were mailed to promi-
nent London Jews, primarily businessmen. See N.Y. Times, May 31, 1972, § I, at I, col. 6. Three
terrorists at Lod (LYDDA) International Airport attacked a crowd of some 250-300 people, killing
25 and wounding 72.
'Geneva Convention, supra note 9, art. 3. Art. 14(l)(a) maintains this emphasis by calling for
sanctions against that traditional pastime of underground organizations-forgery of, and other
falsifications relative to, travel documents.
"International Convention on the High Seas, done at Geneva, Sept. 30, 1962, arts. 14, 15 [1962]
13 U.S.T. 3212, T.I.A.S. No. 5200.
"
5For further problems of offense definition, see Shubber, Is Hijacking of Aircraft Piracy in
International Law? 43 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 193, 199-202 (1968).
"Tokyo Convention, supra note 5.
"TId., art. I.
"SId., art. I ().
"mSee id., ch. 3.
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The Hague Convention, 2 like its predecessor, considered only the possibility
of attempts to seize control of the aircraft in flight, but it did slightly broaden
the definition of "in flight" to include the closing and re-opening of the external
doors of the airplane.2' Even before the completion of the drafting, the inade-
quacy of the "in flight" doctrine was revealed. A bomb placed on board a
Swissair flight exploded killing 47 people" and several jets were hijacked to
Arab territory with ensuing destruction of aircraft, injury, and loss of life;23
but the Convention was inapplicable in both situations.
Against this background, the Montreal Convention24 came into being. It
replaced the "in flight" concept with an "in service" concept. Aircraft in service
include aircraft upon which preflight preparation has commenced and those
which have landed within the last 24 hours.2 5 Punishable offenses were broad-
ened to include placing on board an aircraft any destructive device which would
endanger the plane's safety, the destruction of air navigation facilities, and the
communication of false information which might endanger flight safety'.2
Once it became apparent that airline passengers could serve as hostages to
ensure the diversion of a flight from a scheduled route to a supposed sanctuary,
it was but a short step for hijackers to use passenger hostages to bargain for
ransom or political concessions. In turn, it became apparent that hostages
might be found on the ground, as well as in the air. Since hostages could be
diverted to more than one landing city during the course of a single flight, and
since it was possible to requisition other aircraft to continue these flights, it was
also possible to requisition getaway planes for oneself and one's ground hos-
tages. The potential of such a situation was first unveiled at the Munich Olym-
pics. 27 Thus, actual hijacking was no longer a necessity-planes could be ex-
torted, rather than seized (it is apparently not even necessary to use planes, as
the Lod massacre shows).2
The O.A.S. Convention29 is likewise extremely limited, being concerned only
with the protection of diplomats. 0
The nations of the world have become universally vulnerable to such tactics
at any location. Therefore, the existing hijacking conventions have been su-
perseded by the need for a convention applicable to all such acts of terror.
2 The Hague Convention, supra note 5.
"Id., art. 3(l).
"N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1970, § 1, at 1, col. 4.
2 N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1970, § 1, at I, col. 4.
"Montreal Convention, supra note 5.
'Id., art. 2(b).
111d., art. 1(c)-(e).
"See N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1972, § 1, at 1.
"See N.Y. Times, May 31, 1972, supra note 12.
"O.A.S. Convention, supra note 7.
"'Id., art. I speaks to the murder, kidnapping, and other assaults "against the life or physical
integrity of those persons to whom the State has the duty according to international law to give
special protection as well as extortion in connection with those crimes."
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THE PROPOSED DRAFT CONVENTION
The Proposed Draft approaches the entire subject by focusing on the rela-
tionship between the offender, the victim, the forum state, and the state of
custody. It operates when the act is committed outside the state of which the
offender is a national, and outside the state against which the act is directed,
or against a national from a different state than the forum state, and when the
offender has reason to know that the person is not a national of that state."
Murder, infliction of grievous bodily harm, and kidnapping are covered if the
offense is "of international significance." 2 International significance exists, in
essence, when the nationality of the alleged offender, of the victim, and of the
forum state of the act do not coincide. The act, moreover, must be intended to
damage the interests of, or obtain concessions from, a state or international
organization. Acts by or against members of armed forces in the course of
military hostilities are excepted."3
Falling under this description are acts intended to damage the interests of,
or obtain concessions from, a state or an international organization, provided
that the alleged offender is operating outside his own nation, or the act takes
effect outside the target state. 4 This last clause would therefore cover the letter
bomber mailing from his national state.
Under the proposed convention a state has the duty to extradite or prosecute,
without exception, any offender found within its territory. 5 The Proposed
Draft also requires a state to take measures to establish its jurisdiction when
the offense is committed by one of its nationals or within its territory or when
the alleged offender is present in its territory . 3 The state's territory is defined
as "all territory under the jurisdiction or administration of the state."" All
offenses listed in the Proposed Draft will be extraditable; by ratification of the
Proposed Draft, a state shall have legal grounds for extradition in the absence
of a treaty."
In the event of multiple requests for extradition, the state in which the offense
was committed shall receive priority.39 The accused shall have the right to
communicate immediately with the nearest appropriate representative of his
nation;40 he must also be guaranteed "fair treatment in all stages of the pro-
ceedings."'" The Proposed Draft also contains'numerous procedures for pool-
:"Proposed Draft, supra note 2, art. 1.
:121d.
"*1id., art. I(l)(c)(d).
34d.
31d., art. 3.
31ld., art. 4.
"111d., art. 1(2)(c).
1ld., art. 7.
31d., art. 7(5).
111d., art. 6(2).
"ld., art. 8.
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ing of information and for international cooperation" as well as procedures for
arbitration and conciliation. 3 There are of course problems with the provi-
sions of this convention as well.
Just as the Geneva Convention suffered from its preoccupation with the
assassination of Alexander 1,11 so the Proposed Draft suffers from a preoccupa-
tion with the Munich massacre. Terrorists would still have numerous opportun-
ities to escape justice. Bank robbery 5 and destruction of private and public
property46 are two activities, which terrorists might see fit to employ for their
various purposes.
To be effective this convention must attempt to deal with the shortcomings
noticeable in its predecessors. For instance all previous conventions have suf-
fered from a lack of effective sanctions. Under the Geneva Convention, it
would appear that, extradition is not mandatory. 7 The hijacking conventions
have had numerous problems, the most basic of which is the inadequacies of
all forms of jurisdiction. 8
JURISDICTION
To award jurisdiction to the flag state of an airplane overrides the legitimate
interests of the subjacent state. 9 Clearly territoriality concepts are problematic,
because it may be difficult to determine, due to high jet speeds, the state in
which the offense has occurred; moreover, that state may have no interest in,
or connection with, the airline, the offender, or victim. To award jurisdiction
to the state in which the first landing takes place may be unsatisfactory for the
same reason; it may also be inconvenient to passengers who wish to continue
on their journey, rather than be required to wait around to testify at trial. 50
The High Seas Convention5 did not provide for jurisdiction over domestic
airspace, presumably because there would be no airborne crimes over domestic
"
2Id., arts. 5, 10, 11, 12.
"Id., art. 16.
"See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
"Bank robbery was a favorite fund raising device for revolutionary parties in pre-1917 Russia.
See generally B. WOLFE, THREE WHO MADE A REVOLUTION (1948).
"See N.Y. Times, July 29, 1969, § I, at 6, col. 1. Eight vehicles owned by American nationals
were blown up in Greece by opponents of the junta, who felt that the United States could restore
democracy if it chose to do so.
"According to art. 8(4) of the Geneva Convention, supra note 9, "[tlhe obligation to grant
extradition under the present article shall be subject to any conditions and limitations recognized
by the law or the practice of the country to which application is made." (Emphasis added.)
"See Mendelsohn, In Flight Crime: The International and Domestic Picture Under the Tokyo
Convention, 53 U. VA. L. REV. 509, 511-14 (1967).
"Other criticism of the flag state theory: "The main difficulties include the danger of no punish-
ment, its only partial acceptance in common law countries, the transitional relationship between
aircraft and passengers and the jealous guarding of the right of sovereignty by States overflown."
Gutierrez, Should the Tokyo Convention of 1963 Be Ratified?, 31 J. AIR L. & CoM. 1, 2-4 (1965).50For further criticism see id. 2-4.
5 See supra note 14.
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airspace within the jurisdictional confines of that document.52 The Tokyo Con-
vention was also without teeth, explicitly not obligating any nation party to
extradite53 and, additionally, not requiring any state actually to prosecute the
offender.54 The Montreal Convention, 5 along with the Hague Convention,"
contained far stiffer provisions, requiring the state to take jurisdiction when the
offense is committed in its territory or against or on board an airplane regis-
tered in that state, or where the lessee has his principal place of business in its
territory, or when the plane lands in its territory with the alleged offender still
on board, or where the alleged offender is present in its territory. 7 In the words
of one observer, "it seems preferable to stipulate more positively that any state
that apprehends the hijacker has the right to punish him, no matter where the
offense took place. It may also be asked whether the so-called duty to 'estab-
lish' jurisdiction should not be extended to other states.""
ASYLUM
All conventions against terrorist attacks inevitably must steer a course be-
tween the Scylla of the right to asylum and the Charybdis of the dictates of
international co-operation to prevent crime. The twentieth century has wit-
nessed a turnabout of traditional doctrines of extradition;59 the weight of au-
'
2ld., arts. 14, 15.
5
'Tokyo Convention, supra note 5, art. 16(2).
"Id., art. 13(2) states: "Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, any Contracting
State shall take custody or other measures to ensure the presence of any person suspected of an
act contemplated in Article 11, paragraph I and of any person of whom it has taken delivery. The
custody and other measures shall be as provided in the law of that State but may only be continued
for such time as is reasonably necessary to enable any criminal or extradition proceedings to be
instituted." This provision is as close as the Tokyo Convention comes to indicating a requirement
of prosecution. Another problem is raised in Denaro, In-Flight Crimes, The Tokyo Convention,
and Federal Judicial Jurisdiction, 35 J. AIR L. & CoM. 171, 181-82 (1969): "Though the Tokyo
Convention adequately copes with a situation involving a nonresident alien, it accomplishes little
where a citizen or a resident alien is concerned. The United States, as landing contractee, has the
duty to take custody of those persons also. It cannot, however, deport them through operation of
the Convention. As a result, it is confronted with three possibilities. One, it must extradite if there
exists an appropriate extradition treaty with the flag States; two, it must free the alleged criminal
if the custodial duty is deemed unpursuable; or, three, to avoid such release, it may look to itself
as the proper authority for a prosecution. This last consideration raises a question most acute to
the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary." (i.e. was the offense committed outside the national
territory?)
"Montreal Convention, supra note 5.
'Hague Convention supra note 5. The Hague Convention's extradition procedures are almost
identical, except that the jurisdiction can be established only if the aircraft is registered or chartered
in that state, or if the plane lands in its territory with the alleged offender still on board, or if the
lessee (i.e. one who charters a plane without a crew) has his principal place of business in that state.
See Id., art. 4.
"Montreal Convention, supra note 5, art. 5.
"Van Panhuys, Aircraft Hijacking and International Law, 9 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 16-
17 (1970).
"'See McMahon, Air Hijacking: Extradition as a Deterrent, 58 GEO. L.J. 1135, 1139 (1970).
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thority now is that asylum should be granted to the political offender. Asylum
is no longer a prerogative of the state but rather a right of the individual. The
constitutions and internal laws of several states grant a specific right to
asylum,"0 and several United Nations resolutions reinforce this view; for exam-
ple, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights declares that "[e]veryone has
the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution."'"
Many states have further obligated themselves to grant asylum by ratifying one
of the conventions relating to refugees.62
The Proposed Draft would seem to curtail the right of asylum, by requiring
that the detaining state either extradite the alleged offender, or else submit him
to domestic prosecution, "without exception whatsoever." 6 3 Thus, the United
States would now reverse the drift of international law toward generous asy-
lum, even though every one of its own extradition treaties now in force ex-
pressly prohibits surrender of persons charged with "any crime or offense of a
political character," and some also prohibit surrender for "acts connected with
such crimes or offenses.'' 64
POLITICAL CRIMES EXCEPTIONS
The stand taken by the United States in the Proposed Draft would make no
exception for politically motivated offenses, historically distinguished from
other criminal activities. In defining political offenses a further distinction has
"Originally, political offenders were subject to extradition while the common criminals generally
were not. The age of revolution and the rise of popular governments, however, resulted in numerous
refugees and brought about a new attitude toward the political dissenter. This change in political
philosophy was coupled with technological advances in transportation which gave the fugitive a
greater opportunity to flee to a foreign state to avoid prosecution or persecution. As a result of
these two developments, the original extradition practice in municipal laws and in bilateral treaties
was reversed-political offenders were exempted from extradition while common criminals were
not." See also Garcia-Mora, The Present Status of Political Offenses in the Law of Extradition
and Asylum, 14 U. PITT. L. REV. 371 n.3 (1953).
RAmong those states adopting variations of the right of asylum are U.S.S.R., Federal Republic
of Germany, Mexico, Brazil, and Costa Rica. I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 677 n.2 (8th
H. Lauterpacht ed. 1955); Bassiouni, Ideologically Motivated Offenses and the Political Offenses
Exception in Extradition-A Proposed Judicial Standard for an Unruly Problem, 19 DEPAUL L.
REV. 217, 231 n.29, 236 n.38 (1969); Evans, Reflections Upon the Political Offense in International
Practice, 57 A.J.I.L. I, 2 (1963) (noting that, in general practice, the right to asylum is permissive
for states).
"G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 7 (1948), reprinted in 43 A.J.I.L. 127, 129 (Supp. 1949).
"See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, done at Geneva, July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 150; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, done at New York Jan. 31, 1967,
[1968] 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577; see also G.A. Res. 2312, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at
81, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967).
'Proposed Draft, supra note 2, art. 3. For an argument suggesting that such a clause does not
obligate a state to prosecute, see Mankeiwicz, The 1970 Hague Convention, 37 J. AIR L. & COM.
195, 205 (1971).
"See Bassiouni, International Extradition in American Practice and World Public Order, 36
TENN. L. REV. I, 16-17 (1968).
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grown up between "purely political" and "relative political" offenses. Purely
political offenses are those which injure only the political organization or gov-
ernment of a state and which contain no common crime element." But other
than treason, sedition, or symbolic acts, it is almost impossible to commit an
offense which does not somehow injure the interests of private citizens; thus,
hijacking, no matter how laudable the motive might be, nonetheless is an
assault on the individuals who are passengers or crew."
Consequently, jurists and writers have conceived of the relative political
offense-a common crime connected to a political act, either directly or implic-
itly."7 The relative political offense has been of practical concern to numerous
states, which have been forced to decide whether to grant asylum to an offender
or to extradite him. This decision, in turn, requires that the offender's political
motives be weighed against his crimes. Three tests have been created to guide
this determination: 8 the "incidence" test of Anglo-American law, the "political
objective" test in French law, and the "political motive" test of Swiss law, the
last one being followed by the majority of states which have dealt with the
problem.69
"See Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of Extradition Law,
48 U. VA. L. REV. 1226, 1231-39 (1962); Deere, Political Offenses in the Law and Practice of
Extradition, 27 A.J.I.L. 247, 248 (1933); McMahon, supra note 59, at 1139.
"The problem is highlighted in Evans, supra note 60, at 21:
IT]he concept of the political offense is ambiguous: treason may be justified in terms of
high principles of patriotism or condemned as a despicable attack upon the commonweal
itself. 'Les conspirateurs vaincus sont des brigands, victorieux ils sont des heros.' There
is no doubt that in periods of political stress in a country or where political opposition
is denied or prosecuted, acts, which in the ordinary terms of criminal law are punishable
as common crimes, will be committed for political ends.
7Deere, supra note 65, at 248 n.32; Garcia-Mora, supra note 65, at 1239; McMahon, supra note
59, at 1140.
"There are several exceptions, however. Anarchists receive no consideration under these tests,
e.g. In re Meunier, [1894] 2 Q.B. 415; In re Kaphengst, 56 R.O. 457, [1930] Ann. Dig. 292 (No.
188) (Fed. Trib. Switz. 1930). See also Evans, supra note 60, at 12-13; Garcia-Mora, supra note
65, at 1241. As a result of anarchist activity in the nineteenth century, the so-called attentat
exception arose. See generally Deere, supra note 65; Garcia-Mora, supra note 59. Assassination
of a head of state or members of his family is excluded from the political offense exception in
extradition treaties. Some treaties go so far as to include ministers of state, or even lesser state
functionaries. Garcia-Mora criticizes these treaties, because, under certain circumstances, assassi-
nation may be the only possible means of changing an oppressive political system. Id. at 385. A
more recent exception is genocide, which cannot be considered a political crime for purposes of
refusal to grant extradition. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, adopted Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 278. See generally Garcia-Mora, Crimes Against
Humanity and the Principle of Nonextraditability of Political Offenders, 62 MICH. L. REV. 927
(1964).
"See McMahon, supra note 59, at 1143: "The political motivation test has been endorsed by
the courts of other countries and incorporated into treaties and statutes. Commentators regard the
test, tempered by the theory of predominance, as the most desirable method of determining the
character of an offense for extradition purposes and as best attuned to contemporary political
realities and regard for human rights. See also Garcia-Mora, supra note 65, at 1255-56 and cases
cited therein: Evans, supra note 60, at 21-4.
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Under the incidence test, the offense must be incidental to, and form a part
of, political disturbances resulting from the power struggle within a state be-
tween two or more parties.70 The political objective test looks to the nature of
the rights violated by the offender. Only offenses directly injuring the rights of
a state are regarded as falling under the test; therefore, offenses committed
against private persons do not satisfy the test, even though the offense is
committed in furtherance of political ends.71 The Swiss test requires a direct
connection between common crime and intent to modify the state's political
organization. An inquiry is made as to whether the political goal could have
been achieved through noncriminal means. After all of these factors have been
considered, the offense must be determined to be predominantly political in
character. However, if the offense is of an atrocious character, the common
crime element of the offense will predominate over the political element, and
extradition will be granted.7
In practice, however, all three tests have been modified. The incidence test
developed in an era when political conflicts took place within the framework
of rival party organizations; thus, the individual offender might be regarded as
the agent of a political party.7 3 As such, this analysis is inapplicable to many
of the opponents of totalitarian regimes. A British court refused to apply the
test to a group of Polish seamen who seized a fishing vessel on the high seas to
escape from their homeland.7" The court concluded there that the political
character of the offense must be determined in light of circumstances existing
at the time of its perpetration. Thus, individual action within a totalitarian
regime can be political in character, despite the fact that the offense is not
incidental to a power struggle.
The United States broadened the incidence test to deny extradition in almost
any situation where a link could be shown, however tenuous, between the crime
and political activity; often, a common crime can become a political offense
simply because it took place during times of turbulent political conditions. 7 5
Thus, a Peruvian was declared to be a political offender because the murder
and robbery he allegedly committed took place during the course of a revolu-
tion." A decade later, the State Department declined to extradite to Russia a
7 See In re Castioni, [1891] I Q.B. 149 (1890) (refusal to extradite the alleged murderer of a
Swiss political leaders whose assassination occurred during political disturbances); McMahon,
supra note 59, at 1140-42; Garcia-Mora, supra note 65, at 1240-49.
"
1See Garcia-Mora, supra note 65, at 1249-51. He suggests that, not only does the political
objective test fail to distinguish between pure and relative political offenses, but that such per se
purely political offenses as treason and espionage are likely to be regarded as ordinary crimes. Id.
at 1251, citing I PODESTA COSTA, DERECHO INTERNATIONAL PUBLICO (3d ed. 1955).
"See Evans, supra note 60, at 18-21; Garcia-Mora, supra note 65, at 1251-56; McMahon, supra
note 59, at 1142; Comment, 3 INT'L & COMPAR. L.Q. 97 (1954).
"Garcia-Mora, supra note 65, at 1242.
74Ex parte Kolcynski, [1955] 1 Q.B. 540.
"See Garcia-Mora, supra note 65, at 1246.
"In re Ezeta, 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
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member of the Social Democratic Labor Party who was charged with murder,
arson, and robbery. It found the acts to be "clearly political in their nature,"
with the robbery being "a natural incident to executing the resolutions of the
revolutionary group," which therefore could not be treated as a separate of-
fense.77
In litigation to extradite a wartime minister of the Croatian government to
Yugoslavia to stand trial for war crimes, United States courts propounded
what is probably the most extreme position ever taken on behalf of the political
offense exception. 8 The District Court dismissed an indictment which charged
the defendant with organizing numerous massacres, executions, and mass mur-
ders, alleged to embrace some two hundred thousand victims. The court said,
"[T]he plain reading of the Indictment here makes it immediately apparent
that the offenses for which the surrender of the petitioner is sought, were
offenses of a political character."79 On appeal, the Yugoslav government in-
voked against this statement the several U.N. resolutions on genocide calling
for the trial of war criminals, 0 and alleged the defendant to be such a war
criminal. The Ninth Circuit, however, concluded that the resolutions lacked
sufficient international force to modify long standing judicial interpretation of
extradition treaties."s It ignored the fact that the resolutions were directed at
fascist officials and that ministers of a Nazi puppet state, such as Croatia, were
certainly subject to prosecution.
The French, applying the political objective test,"2 theoretically should be
unable to refuse extradition of a hijacker, since the rights of crew and passen-
gers are inevitably violated. Nevertheless, the French government refused to
extradite two Polish hijackers, who forced a Polish plane to land in the French
sector of West Berlin in an effort to gain asylum. s3 One observer has charged
that French decisions on such matters are motivated by expediency, rather than
legal considerations. 4
"Note from Secretary of State Root to the Russian Ambassador Rosen, Jan. 26, 1909, Depart-
ment of State, file 16649/9, reprinted in 4 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 49
(1942).
t8Artukovic v. Boyle, 140 F. Supp. 245 (S.D. Cal. 1956), affd sub nom. Karadzole v. Artukovic,
247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957), vacated and remanded, 355 U.S. 393 (1958), surrender denied on
remand sub noam. United States v. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
11140 F. Supp. at 247.
1247 F.2d at 205 n. I. See also note 68 supra.
"1247 F.2d at 205. The Court did, however, cite with approval a suggestion that an international
criminal tribunal try such cases.
"See note 71 supra.
"N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1969, § I at I, col. 5. The two hijackers were initially turned over to
West German authorities for processing as refugees.
"Garcia-Mora, supra note 65, at 1250. But he adds: "It must be carefully noted, however, that
in granting the extradition of persons charged with connected crimes, the French courts have
strictly demanded that the political motive of the crime not be regarded as an aggravation of the
offense .. " Garcia-Mora also noted at 1251 that the political objective test is less subject to
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The Swiss test s" has similarly been stretched to accomodate hijackers from
totalitarian regimes. In the Kavic case,88 involving a Yugoslav hijacker, the
court concluded that, for those who refuse to submit to the authority of a
totalitarian government, there is virtually no alternative but to try to escape
abroad. Such an escape is no less worthy of asylum than an active fight for
political power. The court considered the common crime element of the offense
against the crew to be minimal for the political freedom and the very existence
of the accused, depended upon the commission of the offense. 7
Some support for the United States position to reverse these trends is con-
tained in a recent document prepared by the U.N. Secretariat in accordance
with a decision of the Sixth Committee. 8 It declares, "the legitimacy of a cause
does not in itself legitimize the use of certain forms of violence, especially
against the innocent,"" particularly since "the terrorist act usually lacks any
immediate possibility of achieving its proclaimed ultimate purpose."9 The
document states that, very often, the terrorist act is the result of
blind fanaticism, or the adoption of an extremist ideology which subordinates
morality and all other human values to a single aim. In either case, the result
is the same; modern life and modern weapons bring more and more strangers
and foreigners within the reach of the terrorist, and he uses them as instru-
ments for his purpose. As violence breeds violence, so terrorism begets
counter-terrorism, which, in turn, leads to more terrorism in an ever-
increasing spiral."
Furthermore, in some cases, there is no genuine grievance at all, and "a violent
crime affecting more than one country seems to have been committed from
mere cupidity, or a desire to escape criminal prosecution.""
PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES
Legally, a state has complete control over the decision whether to extradite
abuse than would be a broader test of political offenses. Thus the French, applying a formulation
which is directly geared to the nature of the right affected, might more accurately describe theirs
as the "objective test."
"See note 71 supra.
"in re Kavic, Bielanovic and Arsenijevic, 78 (1) R.O. 39, [1952] Ann. Dig. 371 (No. 80) (Fed.
Trib. Switz. 1952).
"Id. at 54-55, Ann. Dig. at 374.
"U.N. Doc. A/C.6/418 (1972).
"'Id., para. 10.
'"Id., para. 1I.
'lId., para. 18.
"ld., para. 16. See also Time, Oct. 4, 1971, at 64-65, presenting findings of Dallas psychiatrist
David G. Hubbard that his study of more than 40 "skyjackers" shows the typical offender to be
generally apolitical, unsuccessful, effeminate, physically as well as emotionally immature, and
possessed of a "driving death wish." The political motive may in reality be a bid to gain power
and mastery, by controlling the fate of an airplane.
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an offender or to grant him asylum under the political offense exception . 3
Practical political considerations do, however, heavily influence the decision.
Primary factors include the state's evaluation of the likely effect on political
relations with the requesting state if the request is denied, the political worth
of the refugee, the degree of national committment to the values involved in
the refugee's conduct, and the extent to which he is likely to present a domestic
political problem." Consequently, "the ideological and political proximity of
the respective states is directly proportional to the likelihood that asylum will
be denied." 5 Naturally, a state will not eagerly extradite a refugee back to a
state controlled by a rival ideology. Whoever, to one country, is a hero may
well be, to another, an immoral villain."
The Proposed Draft, with its requirement to either extradite or prosecute
offenders, will inevitably spark a hostile response from those nations which feel
a condemnation is thus directed at their brand of politics. The Arab states
regard Western pressure against terrorism as pro-Israeli and therefore directed
against the Arabs. Likewise, the Africans resist such moves: "Nothing, not
even exemption for black African independence struggles, seems to remove the
fear that anti-terrorism talk . . . implies repudiation of the struggle of African
peoples to be free of white colonialism." 7 While Communist backing for such
opposition may be anticipated, division and "side-taking" with respect to the
Resolution on Terrorism was not so clear cut as might have been expected. 8
TERRORIST OR LEGITIMATE COMBATANT
Few problems facing the resolution's adoption seem as troublesome as trying
" See H. BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS 535-38 (1952).
"See Bassiouni, supra note 60, at 234. See also Garcia-Mora, supra note 65, at 1227-30, as to
problems associated with extradition.
'
5Bassiouni, supra note 60, at 232.
"A hero of a different sort was Raffaelle Minichiello, the Marine who hijacked a jetliner from
Los Angeles to Rome to escape court-martial proceedings on a charge of breaking and entering.
In Italy, where he had been born, he attracted widespread popular sympathy. Plans have been afoot
to make a movie about his life. NEWSWEEK, March 9, 1970, at 35, 36. At his trial, "it was difficult
to distinguish the prosecution from the defense. Both sides in a torrent of rhetoric, apparently
considered the U.S. the real culprit. . . .. Raffaelle Minichiello is a good, hard-working boy, a
frightened boy,' said Prosecutor Antonio Scopelliti. 'Life took him from the small, calm town of
Melito Irpino, where he was born, to the inferno of Vietnam, and from the fields of Melito to the
chaotic city of New York.'" The defense attorney compared him to Don Quixote. TIME, Nov. 23,
1970, at 32, 34. Although he was eligible for 32 years' imprisonment, Minichiello, after several
reductions of sentence, served only 18 months, and is free today. Id., May 3, 1971, at 34.
'"Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 23, 1972, at 3, col. 2.
"Appearances may be deceiving. The General Assembly passed the Resolution on Terrorism,
supra note I, by a vote of 66-27-33. Among the Arab nations, Jordan voted with the majority, as
did six African states. Lebanon, having just sustained sharp Israeli attacks, abstained along with
Bahrein and Saudi Arabia. Thirteen African states followed suit, while six more absented them-
selves. The East European states, having now experienced both hijackings and harassment by the
Jewish Defense League, abstained. Yugoslavia, beset with Croatian terrorists, supported the reso-
lution. See id., Sept. 25, 1972, at 2, col. I.
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to define the line between terrorism and belligerency. For example, the Geneva
Convention on Prisoners of War" sets up four conditions for defining a bellig-
erent who must, upon capture, be accorded prisoner of war status: 1) He must
be commanded by someone personally responsible for his subordinates. 2) He
must carry arms openly. 3) He must conduct operations in accordance with the
laws and customs of war. 4) He must wear fixed, distinctive signs recognizable
at a distance. However, "it is difficult for any armed forces to comply with all
four conditions .. ."0" Few armed forces, including the American, are will-
ing to comply with the fourth condition.10° The third condition, after decades
of counterinsurgency and the various forms of wars of liberation, is at best an
ambiguous concept. As for the first two conditions, there are several terrorist
organizations which would appear to comply with them.'"2
Several differences between the terrorist and the guerrilla have been
noted;13 the guerrilla thinks primarily in military terms and is concerned with
how to allocate his slender resources; while the terrorist seeks to create wide-
spread fear, his actions are often indiscriminate and excessive. Secondly, guer-
rillas customarily operate in groups, while terrorists may be isolated. Finally,
terrorists (unlike guerrilla forces whose existence tends to create armed con-
flict) can conduct their operations in the absence of armed conflict. On the
other hand, there are also several similarities between the two groups. The acts
of both may be considered war crimes; they will almost certainly be regarded
by the domestic government as criminal. Finally, both the guerrilla and the
terrorist may resort to irregular fighting. In the context of current national
liberation struggles, the two may be closely intertwined. A militarily powerless
group may find terrorism to be its only recourse;" 4 the terrorism may be a stage
"International Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, done at Geneva, Aug.
12, 1949, [1949] 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3364.0OSchwarzenberger, Terrorists, Guerrilleros, and Mercenaries, 1971 TOLEDO L. REV. 71, 79.
'*'Also, the drafters of the Convention apparently did not anticipate the sartorial etiquette of
today's "counterculture."
102Schwarzenberger, supra note 100, at 79.
t"Id. at 71-2. See Bond Application of the Law of War to Internal Conflicts at
'14Cf. U.N. Doc. A/C.6/L867 (1972). Ambassador Soweidi of the United Arab Emirates:
"The people of Palestine have waited in vain for a quarter of a century for some redress
of the grave injustice inflicted upon them. . . .Israel was founded and has maintained
itself by the systematic and ruthless practice of terror: terror which drove the majority
of Palestinians out of their homeland, terror which deprived them of freedom and
dignity, terror which made the remnants who stayed behind second-class citizens in their
own country, terror which pursued them in their unhappy exile, in their wretched refugee
camps, and slaughtered them by the hundred. We do not and cannot condone the killing
of innocent people, but how can we equate the desperate acts of a few individuals driven
by 'misery, frustration, grievance, and despair', to quote the Secretary-General's words,
with the brutal, deliberate and cold-blooded acts of indiscriminate killing perpetrated
by the armed forces of a State? Let us not make the mistake of thinking that these are
acts of revenge. They are concerned primarily with the achievement of long-standing
strategic and political aims." Id. at 26, A/PV.2043.
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of the war itself.10 5
It may be difficult to determine just precisely when a war is taking place;06
Secretary Rogers, speaking to the U.N. at the opening of the current session,
referred to the "no-peace/no-war situation in the mideast."' 0 7 The results of
terrorist activity, on the one hand, and of insurgency or counterinsurgency
tactics, on the other, may be difficult to distinguish, both factually and ethi-
cally. 0 8 Despite Secretary Rogers' references to the importance of the proposal
to all states,' the Proposed Draft appears to stack the deck against wars of
liberation, not only for the above reasons, but also by its definition of the
territory of the state having jurisdiction as comprising all territory under that
state's administration;" thus, the Proposed Draft recognizes Israeli jurisdic-
tion over Palestine and South African jurisdiction over Namibia.
DIFFICULTIES OF THE PROPOSAL FOR U.S. LAW
Although the possibility may be remote, the United States could be seriously
embarrassed by the application of this draft to its domestic law. The draft
expressly requires that the offender either be extradited or prosecuted "without
exception whatsoever.""' The state is further required to take appropriate
measures to ensure the presence of the accused for prosecution or extradition."'
These strong provisions, however, could, under certain circumstances, be frus-
trated by the operation of the American law of criminal procedure. Assume,
for example, that a letter bomber operates out of an American city. If police
authorities searched his apartment under an invalid search warrant, or obtained
incriminating evidence without a warrant, his conviction would be unobtainable
"'"Arab speakers, during the course of the U.N. debate, argued that Israel itself was founded
through the acts of terrorists such as the Stern Gang. See especially the speeches by Ambassador
Baroody of Saudi Arabia, id. at 41, A/PV.2045; by Ambassador AI-Jaber of Kuwait, id. at 112,
A/PV.2057; by Ambassador Khaddam of Syria, id. at 119, A/PV.2058.
'"Cf. Trebat, Internal Violence and the International System: The Experience in Latin America,
46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 308, 311 (1971):
[O]ne author identifies thirty-two 'unequivocal cases of internal war' in Guatemala from
1946 to 1959. According to the definition employed in the present analysis, however,
only the Guatemalan Civil War of 1954 is of direct concern.
"Address by the Honorable William P. Rogers before the 27th United Nations General Assem-
bly, Sept. 25, 1972, in United States Mission to the United Nations, Press Release USUN-104(72)
at 4, 63 DEP'T. STATE BULL. 425 (1972); see N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1972, § 1, at I, col. 5.
'See Speech by Amb. Farah of Somalia, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/L.867 at 140, 142, A/PV.2063.
"Is it more terrible when one bomb is delivered by mail than when hundreds are delivered by
military aircraft?" See also Speech by Amb. Abouhamad of Lebanon, id. at 12, A/PV.2041,
protesting Israeli retortion, the primary burden of which, he indicated, was borne by civilians.
"See USUN-104(72), supra note 107, at 9; see also Statements by Ambassador George Bush,
Before the United Nations, Sept. 22, 1972, Press Release USUN-98(72) at 2; Sept. 23, 1972, Press
Release USUN-103(72).
"'Proposed Draft, supra note 2, art. 1(2)(c).
"'See note 63, supra.
"'Proposed Draft, supra note 2, art. 6.
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because such evidence would be inadmissible under the exclusionary rule."'
Thus, the offender could not be domestically convicted, despite his obvious
guilt; the United States might then be ridiculed by the rest of the world (whose
procedural safeguards do not include the exclusionary rule) for proposing a
strong treaty, which it then was unable itself to enforce. Although the Proposed
Draft, in delineating the responsibilities of the custodial state, does contain the
phrase "under its internal law,""' 4 the wording could be considerably strength-
ened. The Geneva Convention provided (albeit in regard to extradition proceed-
ings) that extradition "could not be granted for a reason not connected with
the offense itself.""' 5 The Montreal Convention allows the prosecuting authori-
ties to make their decision "in the same manner as in the case of any ordinary
offense of a serious nature under the law of that State."" 6
In the hypothetical situation presented, it is also uncertain whether the of-
fender could be extradited."7 (Alternatively, he could be deported, as deporta-
tion hearings may be conducted without regard to fourth amendment stan-
dards.)"' An international extradition hearing requires that the accused be
brought before a judge or magistrate to determine under the provisions of the
proper treaty whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the charge, and, upon
so determining, to certify to the Secretary of State that the warrant may
issue.119
The treaty may, however, provide for very loose standards. Thus, while
under interstate extradition procedure, the requesting state is supposed to sup-
ply a quantum of evidence sufficient under the law of the extraditing state to
bind the alleged offender over for trial in that state.2 0 A recent complaint which
stated only that the fugitive was accused of murder was held sufficient, under
the terms of an extradition treaty with Mexico.'M The courts, moreover, have
on several occasions reaffirmed the lower standards allowed in international
extradition. Mr. Justice Holmes, in Glucksman v. Henkel,2 1 referred to "the
factitious niceties of a criminal trial at common law" as a "waste of time" when
the existence of an extradition treaty binds us to the assumption that the
"'Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
'"Proposed Draft, supra note 2, art. 6.
"'Geneva Convention, supra note 9, art. 10(a).
"'Montreal Convention, supra note 5, art. 7.
" But see O'Higgins, Disguised Extradition: The Stolen Case, 27 MOD. L. REV. 521 (1964),
showing how three governments connived to evade their extradition laws, which would have pre-
vented the accused's rendition. Other "self-help" remedies (particularly forcible abduction) have
been examined in Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
'"Shaughnessy v. United States, 345 U.S. 206 (1952) (attorney-general may exclude alien with-
out hearing); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 230 (1960) (implying inapplicability of Fourth
Amendment to deporation arrests).
"18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1970).
'"Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 463 (1888).
"'United States v. Marasco, 325 F.2d 562, 564 (2d Cir. 1963).
12221 U.S. 508 (1911).
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accused will receive fair trial in the requesting state. 2 ' In Fernandez v.
Phillips,'24 he also said: "Form is not to be insisted upon beyond the require-
ments of safety and justice."' 2 5 This dictum formed the basis for the holding in
United States v. Mulligan'26 that evidence to establish reasonable grounds to
believe the accused guilty (and therefore extraditable) need not be sufficient to
convict nor satisfy technical rules governing admissibility in criminal trials.'27
In United States v. Marasco,128 the District Court declared that this relaxed
evidentiary standard had been consistently upheld, but it could cite only
Mulligan in support. Thus, the weight of authority 2 for this rule is slender,
and a future case could easily be distinguished from, or result in, the overruling
of the Marasco line of cases. This view is reinforced by the fact that all the
relevant cases, except Marasco, predate the judicial revolutions of the 1930's
and the 1960's, which so substantially upgraded the content of due process.2 "
ASSESSMENT
While the Proposed Draft represents a major effort to deal with the problem
of terrorism, it contains three shortcomings: First, the number of offenses
covered should be expanded, lest it suffer the fate of the hijacking treaties and
be outstripped by new techniques of terror. Second, it should more clearly
allow for deference to national criminal procedural law; as the matter stands,
the United States itself could be placed in an embarrassing position.",' Third,
it is questionable whether any good will be served by calling for the passage of
the conflicting, overlapping hijacking treaties, and, moreover, to allow them
to take precedence over the Proposed Draft. This would lead to anomalies in
the law against terrorist activities; with the Tokyo Convention in force, the
'11d. at 512.
24 268 U.S. 311 (1925).
1 '2 d. at 312 (citing Glucksman v. Henkel).
12650 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 665 (1931).
'250 F.2d at 688.
121375 F. Supp. 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
'See Note, Interstate Rendition and the Fourth Amendment, 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 551, 577-
79 (1970). An analogy might be found in the fact that a sizeable number of state courts have disre-
garded fourth amendment considerations in extradition hearings. Rationales include: I) The fourth
amendment was never intended to apply to extradition hearings. 2) The conflict between effective
law enforcement and individual rights requires that there be a lesser standard of justification for
extradition hearings. 3) The fourth amendment is irrelevant in extradition hearings, since judgment
on legality of the arrest is properly the responsibility of the requesting state. 4) The decision to
extradite properly, belongs within the sphere of the Executive. 5) The extraditing court should not
make an inquiry into the issue of guilt or innocence. (Possible support for this view stems from
the fact that extradition is generally termed a civil, rather than a criminal, proceeding.) 6) Some
courts apparently are willing to disregard technical defects in the warrant entirely.
'i0 n re Extradition of D'Amico, 185 F. Supp. 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), might be noted in passing.
The court, by finding a search and seizure inside a home to be legal, avoided passing on whether
the same Constitutional standards apply to extradition proceedings and to trials.
See text at note 112 supra.
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hijacker of an airplane might even go free, 32 but the hijacker of a boat, being
covered by the Proposed Draft, would almost certainly be imprisoned.
Even without these shortcomings, however, the Proposed Draft will probably
not be ratified. It would too drastically reverse the almost universal trend of
national and international policy toward leniency. 3 This trend is the result
of the increased stress on asylum, the broadening of the political offense excep-
tion, and the unworkability of standards purporting to classify such concepts
as belligerency and guerrilla warfare. Above all, this trend is the result of pure
political expediency, which promotes terrorist activities from behind the shield
of an ideologically sympathetic state. Consequently, the international com-
munity has resisted the imposition of strong conventions on terrorism. The
toothless Tokyo Convention was ratified but the far stronger Montreal Con-
vention has been approved by only twelve states. 13 4 The Geneva Convention
was ratified by only one state.'35 The O.A.S. Convention, in order to win
approval, was subjected to a lessening of the potential impact of extradition
provisions by addition of a guarantee of the right of states to grant asylum.1aR
There are two possible solutions to this impasse. The first is that nations
could undertake to provide minimum sanctions against violators for whom
ideological sympathy exists (although Article Two of the Proposed Draft calls
for severe penalties.) This approach is exemplified by the French sentencing of
two Polish hijackers to two years imprisonment." 7 Also, Austria sentenced
two other hijackers from Poland to 27 and 24 months, respectively, and then
had them deported.'38 This approach would, among other advantages, soften
the sting of a hypothetical decision by a Federal court to sentence refugees from
the Iron Curtain to prison.
Alternatively, recognizing that political realities militate against acceptance
of the Proposed Draft, a new clause might be inserted providing that a state
need not extradite or prosecute for acts committed against nationals or instru-
mentalities (e.g. aircraft) of the state against which the act is directed.' 39 While
'
32See text at note 14 supra.
"uSee pp. 431-32 supra.
"'
34See U.N. Doc. A/C/6/418, Annex IV, at 1.
'Hudson, supra note 10.
'Compare O.A.S. Convention, supra note 7, with Inter-American Juridical Committee: Draft
Convention on Terrorism and Kidnapping of Persons for Purposes of Extortion, O.A.S. Doc.
CP/doc. 54/70 rev. I of Nov. 4, 1970, in 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1177 (1970). The Draft Convention
was approved by a 6-2-2 vote. Id. at ed. n. The Convention itself was approved by a vote of 13-1-2
in the O.A.S. General Assembly. 10 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 255, ed. n., supra note 7. See also
Statement of Reasons for the Draft Convention, O.A.S. Doc. CP/doc. 54/70 rev. I of Nov. 4,
1970, in 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1250 (1970).
'N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1969, § 1, at 3, col. 7.
" See Horlick, The Developing Law of Air Hijacking, 12 HARV. J. INT'L L. 33, 58 (1971). See
also note 96 supra.
"'The suggestion advanced by this Note is closely analogous to the passive personality jurisdic-
tional principle, which allows a state to assert jurisdiction over an offender against one of its
nationals. It has been successfully invoked in only two cases-the Cutting Case (conviction by
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this proposal seems callous, and possibly even subversive of the purpose of the
Proposed Draft, it might secure the protection of innocent third parties. Uni-
versally applicable provisions will be unacceptable, thus dooming third parties
as well as the real targets of the terror. Although a state could deny extradition
of its ideological allies, it would have greater difficulty in justifying a refusal
to extradite to a neutral third party state, whose citizens have been needlessly
victimized. A state would be justified in refusing to extradite in a Munich type
situation14 (where no outsiders were affected; the airport shootout can be
justified as self-defense 1 ') but extradition would still be mandatory in a Lod-
type situation' (where Puerto Ricans were killed in addition to Israelis). With
this modification the use of terror would at least have to be exercised with
restraint, rather than employed indiscriminately by those wishing to avoid
punishment. 4 Terrorists would be forced to reconsider their objectives and
tactics; even this should ameliorate the present situation.
B.B.
Mexico for libel perpetrated in Texas), see 1887 U.S. Foreign Rel. 757; 1888 U.S. Foreign Rel.
1114; see generally 2 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 232-40 (1906); and the case of The S.S. Lotus,
[1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9 (ship collision resulting from criminal negligence). According to the
Harvard Research in International Law in 29 A.J.I.L. 578-79 (Supp. 1935): "An important group
of States asserts such jurisdiction; others would contest it. Many writers favor it, while others
oppose it." The study listed 27 states as recognizing the principle in 1935. Id. It offered two
criticisms. First, serious questions exist as to the safeguards and limitations on the principle, id. at
579; however, the Proposed Draft should satisfactorily answer this objection. Second, the universal-
ity principle serves every legitimate purpose for which passive personality might be invoked,
without inviting controversy, id. In the current situation, it has been demonstrated that universality
is unacceptable.
"'Supra note 27.
"'Of course, if terrorists were to escape to a nation which was not in ideological sympathy, such
a defense would probably not be recognized, and they would still be extradited, either under the
Proposed Draft or under some other extradition agreement.
"'Supra note 26.
"it is, of course, recognized that the possibility of avoiding punishment is not a determinative
planning factor in some cases. Members of certain radical groups apparently are not overly
concerned with the possibility of punishment or even death. As an example, the lone surviving
perpetrator of the Lod massacre reportedly stated: "I'm waiting for the Israelis to execute me.
I'm sorry I didn't die at the airport." N.Y. Times, June 2, 1972, § 1, at 4, col. 2.
1973]
